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Abstract 
This article offers an inquiry into the discursive construction of 
‘terrorism’ by France 24, the French international broadcaster, in the 
aftermath of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in January 
2015. The article argues that the broadcaster seems to employ a 
relatively narrow definition of terrorism linking it to Islam and Muslims. 
France 24 portrays the attacks as an external phenomenon coming to 
France from outside. The blame is assigned to non-French factors, 
mainly to foreign extremist organisations, Islamist ideologues and 
overseas training. No reasons for violence are sought inside the 
country. Internal developments, such as discrimination, youth 
marginalisation, lack of educational and work opportunities, relations 
between law enforcement and the Muslim community that could 
potentially contribute to the acts, are not explored by the broadcaster’s 
investigative journalism. This narrow interpretation of ‘terrorism’ that 
assigns responsibility to Muslims, Islamic indoctrination and overseas 
training may further alienate Muslim communities in France’s already 
divided society. It points to narrow policy responses that focus mainly 
on stricter monitoring of Muslim minorities, on limiting combat and 
cross-border movement. This type of discourse excludes long-term 
policy solutions that address broader socio-politico-economic 
conditions in which ‘terrorism’ might flourish. 
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Introduction 
This article offers an inquiry into the discursive construction of 
‘terrorism’ by France 24 (F24), the French international broadcaster, in 
the aftermath of the attacks on the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in 
January 2015. Totally, 12 people were shot dead in the attack. The 
majority of the victims were cartoonists, employees of the magazine, 
known for making fun of politicians, religions and famous personalities. 
It became the deadliest assault on human life to have been committed 
on the French soil in the preceding two decades. The cartoons of 
Prophet Mohammed published by Charlie Hebdo, considered offensive 
by followers of Islam, were the reason behind the attack. However, this 
was not the first time the magazine had published pictures of 
Mohammed. Earlier in December 2012, French Muslim communities 
sued Charlie Hebdo over the publication of similar images. The 
magazine later received numerous threats from radical Muslims which 
led the French police to allocate security officers to protect the 
magazine’s journalists and their right to free expression. 
This article focuses on the othering process of terrorists by F24. It 
poses three questions with regard to the broadcaster’s narrative of 
Charlie Hebdo attacks: (1) What makes a ‘terrorist’ in the eyes of the 
broadcaster? (2) Which drivers, root causes and permissive factors 
contributed to the attacks? and (3) What broader debate does this 
discourse enable? It is argued that the broadcaster employed a 
relatively narrow definition of terrorism linking it solely to Islam and 
Muslims. It portrayed the attacks as an external phenomenon and 
assigned the blame to non-French factors, mainly to foreign extremist 
organisations, Islamist ideologues and overseas training. No reasons for 
violence were sought inside the country. Internal developments, such 
as discrimination, youth marginalisation, lack of educational and work 
opportunities, relations between law enforcement and the Muslim 
community that could potentially contribute to the acts, were not 
explored by the broadcaster’s investigative journalism. This narrow 
interpretation of ‘terrorism’ may further alienate Muslim communities 
in France’s already divided society. It reinforces the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
divide creating animosity between the West and Islam and sustains the 
climate of fear of terrorism. 
 
 
Muslims as France’s ‘others’: Orientalising Islam 
Western media officially began their onslaught on Muslims in the post-
9/11 era, publicly associating Islam with terrorism, and Muslims with 
terrorists (Nurullah, 2010). This trend did not affect other religions as 
no connections were made in scholarly debates, or media coverage, 
between, for example, Christianity, or Judaism, and terrorism. In his 
book Covering Islam, Said argued that the Western media’s coverage 
and interpretation of Islam is extremely influential and the success ‘of 
this coverage can be attributed to the political influence of those 
people and institutions producing it rather than necessarily to truth or 
accuracy’ (Said, 1981: 169). The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s helped the West to discover a new enemy to fight against and 
claim their superiority. As Said observed, ‘fundamentalism’, particularly 
Islamic Fundamentalism ‘equals everything we must now fight against, 
as we did with communism during the Cold War’ (Said, 1981: xix). This 
idea was further supported by Samuel Huntington in 1993. His ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ predicted that ‘the great divisions among humankind and 
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ and that ‘the principal 
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of 
different civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993: 22). 
Movies, serials and news coverage followed in the Western media 
that ‘portrayed Muslims as uncivilized, anti-modern, anti-democratic, 
and terrorists, fundamentalists, radicals, militants, barbaric, and anti-
western’ (Nurullah, 2010: 1022). Individual violent incident or any 
extremist movement in Islamic countries became quickly attributed to 
Islam. The persistent bias in the Western media with regard to the Arab 
world was quickly accepted as a fact in the Middle East (Powell, 2011: 
92) and led many Muslims to perceive the media as an enemy and 
conspirator against them (Siddiqi, 1999: 204). Research has shown that 
terrorism is regularly connected to Islam and as a result, Muslims and 
Arabs now represent a negative ‘Other’ (Nurullah, 2010: 1022). 
Stereotypes and fear of terrorists have led to sweeping changes in 
governmental practices in the West, including curtailing of civil liberties 
and increased support for racial profiling (Altheide, 2004). 
France’s encounters with Muslims and Islam date back to 8th century 
when Northern African soldiers established a protectorate and mosque 
in Narbonne. Muslim settlers continued to arrive throughout the 
Middle Ages and early Modern Period (Clément, 1990). In 1830, France 
captured Algeria, its first colony with large Muslim populations. World 
War I resulted in the first large-scale migration of Muslim colonial 
subjects who came to serve in the Metropolitan army and replace 
French workers in factories (Frémeaux, 1991). Post-World War II labour 
shortages brought another wave of migrants from the colonies. By 
1975, over 1 million of Muslim immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Turkey were living in metropolitan France (Noiriel, 1988). 
Today, France is home to 6 million Muslims, the largest Muslim 
population in the European Union. Estimates indicate that 78% of them 
are of North African descent and 12% come from the Middle East, 
including Turkey (PEW, 2011). 
The Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in 
socioeconomic terms (Camillieri, 2013). A recent study demonstrated 
that unemployment rates among immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Turkey are particularly high and are even higher among the 
descendants of immigrants from these countries. Muslims also report 
higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in 
France. In 2005, a series of riots erupted in the suburbs of Paris and 
other French cities resulting in three deaths and nearly 3000 arrests. 
The unrest was an expression of frustration with high unemployment, 
police harassment and brutality among France’s large immigrant 
population, mostly North African (Canet et al., 2008). 
Islam did not present a challenge and remained absent from official 
and media discourses at the time of large Muslim arrivals in mid-20th 
century. However, when migrant workers did not return home as 
previously expected, and instead brought their families to live with them, 
‘France suddenly found itself concerned with the integration of Muslims 
of all ages and backgrounds into what was previously a predominantly 
Catholic Christian nation’ (Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 65). A series of 
unsuccessful efforts to cut back on the number of North Africans 
followed, ranging from paying migrants to leave the country, to 
deportations, to revisions to the French Code of Nationality in early 
1990s (Hargreaves, 1995). The 1980s saw the rise of Le Pen’s Front 
National, a far-fight anti-immigration and anti-Muslim party, whose racist 
and neo-Nazi rhetoric generated considerable electoral support in years 
to come (Marcus, 1995). Although Le Pen never succeeded in 
presidential elections, his far-right views on immigration influenced 
national debate around Muslim communities. The wearing of all visible 
religious symbols in public schools was banned in 2004 followed by a ban 
on face veils in public places in 2010 (Allen, 2010). The relationships 
between the French society and Muslims became characterised by 
mutual suspicion: the French exhibit taste-based discrimination against 
Muslims and Muslims perceive French institutions as systematically 
discriminatory and therefore dislike the French (Adida et al., 2014). 
Today, national discourses in France portray Muslims as a mostly 
homogenous group, unwilling to integrate with the wider population. 
Lamont (2003) notes that while the American ‘them’ are Blacks, the 
French ‘them’ are Arabs. Fredette (2014) discovered that an identity for 
the Muslims has been constructed in France by a small, yet highly 
influential group of people, with centralised media at its forefront. This 
elitist discourse disregards the diversity of the Muslim communities and 
defines them exclusively by their religious background. This reductionist 
view asserts that Islamic values and traditions are in opposition to 
French republicanism and that it is Islam that keeps Muslims from 
becoming fully French. 
Terrorism on the French soil and its connection to Islam 
Islam was linked to terrorism in French discourses during the Algerian 
war of independence throughout the 1950s. With a series of street 
assassinations ‘the war rapidly degenerated into a gruesome, civil-war-
style conflict of indiscriminate, merciless terrorism pitted against 
horrific, systematic torture and counterterror’ (Fetzer and Soper, 2005). 
The Algerian Front de libération nationale (FLN) drew much of its 
rhetoric and motivation from Islam, and many French soon developed a 
tremendous fear of this religion. A wave of terrorist attacks throughout 
19901 and rapidly rising crime rate – blamed largely on immigrants – 
further aggravated the already tense relations between ethnic French 
and residents of North African heritage. The riots in predominantly 
immigrant suburbs (banlieues) in 2005 were not classified as acts of 
terrorism. A state of emergency was introduced for 3 months, but no 
direct relationship was established between mostly ethnic-based riots 
and radical Islamism or jihadism. 
French Muslims, who have been involved in terrorist attacks, are 
usually from immigrant communities, predominantly Algerian, they 
have very low level of education. At least 70% of them have been 
unemployed and the remaining 30% had basic manual jobs (Marret, 
2010). Only a handful of individuals reached graduate level of 
education. According to Marret, ‘French Jihadists’ suffer from long 
periods of unemployment, display various forms of delinquency and 
often undergo radicalisation process in prisons. Due to this very low 
level of education and minimal technical ability, French terrorist 
‘soldiers’, as Marret argues, are not in a position to co-ordinate and 
carry out sophisticated operations, such as American 9/11, that require 
highly skilled, educated, financially well-off and well-informed 
masterminds. 
The path to terrorism 
Defining ‘terrorism’ and a ‘terrorist’ is not an easy task. Le Sage (2007) 
argues that terrorism is a manifestation of political violence that is 
distinct from other types of violence, such as organised crime, mass civil 
conflict, riots or uprisings. It is characterised by deliberate premeditation 
with the aim of creating a climate of extreme fear. According to 
Crenshaw (2002), terrorist aims exist at several levels: it targets a wider 
audience to attract attention at one level, but conveys a political or 
ideological statement beyond its immediate victims, at another. Its 
targets are often symbolic, frequently not aims in themselves. The acts of 
terrorism are planned to be spectacular in an effort to capture the public 
and media attention. Through its choice of symbolic targets of 
representative meaning and shocking methods terrorism is repeatedly 
used to influence broader political behaviour and advance a particular 
set of political and social objectives. 
Scholars agree that no one is born a terrorist and that individuals 
become terrorists through a comprehensive process of radicalisation 
(Ranstorp, 2010). Dannin (2005) has examined recruits’ path to 
terrorism through their conversion to Islam and the role of religion in 
the process. He observed that the instructions given to new converts do 
not necessarily allow them to distinguish between the sectarian 
divisions of Islam. In some cases, recruits were motivated exclusively by 
a ready-made Islam, an adaptation reduced to basic practices related to 
clothing, food or prayers, rather than a thorough study of the faith. 
Many new converts are recruited in prisons, but the self-imposed 
discipline that restructures their lives down to the way they eat, dress, 
break up their day, study and think also attracts individuals outside of 
prisons who are to some extent socially frustrated. 
Terrorism also needs an environment in which it can thrive: the 
possible root causes that encourage individuals to lead or support 
terrorist enterprises and permissive factors allowing terrorist groups to 
perform operations on a given territory (Le Sage, 2007: 6). The two 
common root causes that are believed to fuel terrorism include lack of 
democracy and desperation associated with extreme poverty. 
Undemocratic rules with repressive or under-representative 
governance, combined with popular resentment towards a 
government’s inability to effect change, preclude options for peaceful 
solutions and lead to violent efforts to overthrow the existing political 
establishment (Windsor, 2003). Furthermore, poverty and 
unemployment may lead to marginalisation of entire social groups and 
serve as fertile ground to breed potential recruits (Piazza, 2006; UN, 
2004). Permissive factors often consist of physical, economic, 
institutional and political weaknesses in countries where terrorist acts 
are carried out, as well as low capacity of security forces to prevent 
terrorists from entering their territories. Anger at unpopular policies of 
governments may also clash with sympathies worldwide and lead to 
increased ideological support for terror. No single aspect can explain 
why terrorism happens and multiple reasons may lead to the feelings of 
alienation and antagonism that make terrorist recruitment possible. 
Discourse as theory and method 
The article examines the discursive formation of terrorism by F24 
(English) in its reporting of Charlie Hebdo attacks. It draws on the daily 
online stories and broadcast news bulletins recorded for 2 weeks after 
the January attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine. From the overall 78 
online stories tagged ‘Charlie Hebdo’ in the examined period, 28 news 
items were selected on the theme directly related to the attacks and the 
persons of the attackers. Discourse analysis were conducted on the 
stories and footage gathered. The article explores discourse productivity 
of F24’s particular representation of the attacks, the way the broadcaster 
produces (or re-produces) the problem it explains. The article 
investigates the voices that speak in the stories, as well as their ‘truths’ 
on the attacks. It looks at the production of publics (audiences), the 
public’s common sense and reactions in which the publics are expected 
to act (Keeley, 1990). This is to discover the conveyed meanings that 
render certain policies logical and proper and, thus, influence and 
legitimise practices (Campbell, 1993). According to Foucault (1980), those 
who produce discourse have the power to produce a ‘regime of truth’, to 
enforce its validity, its scientific and factual status. Through the study of 
discourse, this article enquires into the knowledge/power nexus 
(Campbell, 1993; Foucault, 1980, 1991). It wishes to expose to critical 
questioning the discursive and social practices that discourse enables, as 
well as the ideological consequences it carries. 
Discourse analysis follows the three-dimensional model suggested by 
Fairclough (1995): (1) textual, (2) inter-textual and (3) contextual. 
Textual analysis concentrates on the formal/linguistic features of the 
text and examines texts for their common lexicon of terms (labels and 
attributes ascribed to things). It allows for the uncovering of 
relationships in which things are placed in a discourse, where one 
object is distinguished from, or privileged, over another, usually in 
binary oppositions, to ultimately uncover the relation of power (De 
Saussure, 1974; Derrida, 1981). Inter-textual analysis examines how 
authors of texts draw on already existing discourses to create their 
texts. Contextual analysis puts text into context and explores the links 
between language use and social practice. 
Coverage of terrorism by F24 
In the first days after the attacks, coverage by F24 tended to lean 
towards episodic reporting focusing exclusively on reporting the 
incidents of the day. Episodic coverage directly follows an event, while 
thematic coverage generally occurs later, after time has passed (Iyengar 
and Simon, 1993). Episodic reporting is usually event or case oriented 
and focuses on concrete incidents, with no connections between 
isolated cases. The cameras, which followed the ‘manhunt’ (France 24, 
2015c) for 3 days, did little more than document the developments 
unfolding. The coverage concentrated on incidents of terrorism rather 
than on comprehensive exploration of the phenomenon, its root 
causes, convictions, motives, intentions of terrorist agents and the role 
of enabling environment. As days passed, the coverage became more 
thematic. Terrorism was interpreted by F24 as Muslim-related activity 
and as an external activity threatening France from outside. Terrorism 
was not seen as home-grown phenomenon whose advent and presence 
in France might have been caused and accelerated by domestic 
conditions. 
Construction of terrorism acts 
The immediate coverage by France 24 (2015a) defined the act as a 
‘terrorist attack’ on the day of its occurrence, before the act was 
established by investigators as terrorism or any arrest or formal action 
was undertaken by the authorities. The first reports depicted the 
shootings as a ‘bloody attack’ and a ‘deadly rampage’ (France 24, 
2015b). The use of heavily charged descriptors intensified as the police 
search for the attackers continued. The attacks, viewed as the ‘worst 
assault on France’s homeland security for decades’ (France 24, 2015d), 
were quickly described as the ‘French September 11’ (France 24, 2015e) 
and ‘the country’s deadliest terrorist attack in half a century’ (France 
24, 2015f). 
The only footage available to television channels was an amateur 
video by a local resident filmed on his mobile phone from the window 
overlooking the scene. The uncredited video captured two men in 
black, wearing balaclavas, on their way from the magazine’s 
headquarters to the car, with machine guns in their hands. Their 
anonymous identity was partly revealed by their own words, ‘Hey! We 
avenged the Prophet Muhammad! We killed Charlie Hebdo’. Subtitles 
translated their French words into English for F24’s global viewers. The 
suspense, mystery and the unknown identity of the two gunmen were 
further increased by images of blood on the street and the sound of 
gunshots in the background. The graphic record of their act 
perpetuated the feeling of horror among the broadcaster’s global 
audience. 
It was evident from the follow-up reporting that broadcasting media, 
F24 included, thrived on the coverage of terrorism. According to 
Neumann and Smith (2005: 583), 
sophisticated terrorists recognize that there is a potentially symbiotic 
relationship between themselves and the media. All they need to do 
is to satisfy the media’s appetite for a ‘good story’, which means 
providing the ‘mystery, quick action, tension [and] drama’ for which 
the big television networks are longing. 
F24 indulged in live coverage of the events unfolding and what was 
described as the ‘day of terror in Paris’ (France 24, 2015d) turned into a 
live soap-opera of ‘53 hours of terror’ (France 24, 2015f). Journalists 
took their viewers on a drive around the French countryside in the 
chase for the two attackers on the run. They reported the police 
operations, road blockades and home searches from their cars, talking 
to the camera positioned on the back seat. Landscapes passing by the 
side-windows and wipers clearing the front screen gave viewers the 
impression of physical presence in the heart of the chase. The raids on a 
print factory in one part of Paris and on a supermarket in another 
televised live gave the ‘dramatic climax’ (France 24, 2015f) to the story, 
‘the bloody climax with not one, but two hostage sieges’ (France 24, 
2015g). Suspense was maintained by the lack of footage from inside the 
locations of the two police takeovers and by the use of short 
statements for dramatic effects: ‘gunfire rang out, followed by blasts, 
and then silence, as smoke could be seen billowing from the roof of the 
print shop’ (France 24, 2015f). Images of smoke, sounds of gunshots, 
hostages running out in fear kept audiences central to the broadcaster’s 
reporting. The meaning of images was manifest in the interpretation it 
generated in viewers. The old battle between good and evil was 
televised live in an unscripted string of events. 
Construction of terrorism agents 
Four people were implicated in two separate attacks. Said and Cherif 
Kouachi, two brothers were behind the attack on the Charlie Hebdo 
satirical magazine. Amédy Coulibaly was responsible for the attack on 
the kosher supermarket. Hayat Boumeddiene, Coulibaly’s female 
companion, was believed by the police to be his assistant in the attack. 
Journalists remained cautious with the application of the term 
‘terrorist’ and used ‘suspects’ instead to describe the attackers. 
Captured by the amateur video, perpetrators’ claim, ‘We a venged the 
Prophet Muhammad!’ left no doubt about the connection between the 
killings and Islam. Without verification, media organisations quickly 
assumed that the attackers were Muslims, and the Muslim connection 
was the only thread pursued by F24’s reporters. It was discussed, 
however, not in relation to faith, but in relation to Islamism as a 
terrorist force. 
The two attackers on the satirical magazine were introduced to the 
public as Cherif (32) and Said (34) Kouachi. The family relationship 
between the pair became clear from day 2, after their identities had 
been established on the basis of an ID card left by one of the brothers 
in the abandoned getaway car. The broadcaster briefly mentioned that 
both men were born in Paris, after which attention was swiftly directed 
to one of the brother’s ‘record of funnelling jihadi fighters to Iraq’ 
known to the French intelligence services (France 24, 2015f). For F24’s 
global audiences who might be unfamiliar with the French jus soli, no 
effort was made to explain that a person’s place of birth determines 
citizenship. Having been born in Paris made the two brothers French 
citizens, a fact never mentioned by F24 in the period covered. Instead, 
frequent references to their ‘Algerian origin’ and status of ‘off-spring of 
Algerian parents’ (France 24, 2015h) portrayed them as foreign. The 
suspects were depicted as extreme, professional and very well-trained 
killers who carefully planned and executed their attack. Their ‘cold-
blooded professionalism’ (France 24, 2015j) remained unspoiled by the 
news emerging about an ID card left, perhaps by mistake, in the 
abandoned car after the shooting. The clumsy conduct did not lead the 
broadcaster to doubt the quality of their expertise. 
Amédy Coulibaly was the third suspect, who ‘clearly linked’ to the 
Charlie Hebdo shootings, ‘threatened to kill the hostages if police 
launched an assault on the Kouachi brothers’ (France 24, 2015i). 
Described by the broadcaster as the ‘gunman’ (France 24, 2015h), 
‘hostage-taker’ (France 24, 2015i) or an ‘Islamist militant’ (France 24, 
2015q), he was portrayed as a criminal, ‘jailed several times for petty 
crimes, including theft and drug dealing’ (France 24, 2015f). Apart from 
references to Boumeddiene, his wife and alleged partner in the attacks, 
no background was explored. Family, friends, childhood, education or 
professional activities were omitted from the image that F24 
constructed. References to his ‘African descent’ and Malian parents did 
not bring his French citizenship to audiences’ attention (France 24, 
2015g). 
Hayat Boumeddiene, a Paris-born 26-year-old woman, was the fourth 
suspect in the attacks. F24 described her as ‘wanted by police in 
connection with the deadly attacks’ (France 24, 2015l), committed 
together with Amédy Coulibaly, her married partner. Considered by the 
police as ‘armed and dangerous’ (France 24, 2015k), she allegedly fled 
the crime scene after the supermarket standoff, left France and 
remained ‘France’s most-wanted woman’. By contrast to the three 
male attackers, she was attributed human characteristics. One of her 
childhood friends was quoted recalling Boumeddiene’s attendance of a 
‘girls’ dinner’ and describing her as someone who was ‘emotionally 
fragile’ who ‘often cries and has little confidence in herself’ (France 24, 
2015d). The origin of her parents was not mentioned, nor was her birth 
place and citizenship, a manoeuvre that silenced her connection with 
France. 
 
 
Construction of Muslims 
In its coverage of Charlie Hebdo attacks, the broadcaster associated 
being Muslim with being a terrorist. The Kouachis statement ‘We 
avenged the Prophet Muhammad!’ captured by the amateur video, 
used and re-used in all news bulletins after the shootings reinforced the 
stereotype that terrorists are Muslim. All suspects were quickly 
identified as Muslims and quickly linked to jihadist cause through their 
allegiance to terrorist groupings and military training. Belonging to 
foreign terrorist groups was suggested by F24 from the outset despite 
the lack of evidence or verification (France 24, 2015h, 2015m). 
Anonymous ‘police source’ was quoted saying that Coulibaly, the 
hostage-taker, ‘was a member of the same jihadist group as the two 
suspects in the Charlie Hebdo attack’ (France 24, 2015i). Yet, Coulibaly 
was later connected with the Islamic State (IS) and the two brothers 
with Al Qaeda (France 24, 2015d, 2015r). 
The suspects’ past was thoroughly explored by F24 reporters in 
search of evidence for their Muslim connections and radicalisation 
process that led them to the attacks. The younger brother Cherif 
Kouachi was described as ‘known to the counter-terrorism authorities’ 
for his involvement in a ‘recruitment pipeline for Muslim holy war in 
the multi-ethnic working-class 19th arrondissement of Paris’ (France 24, 
2015h). He was said to have travelled to Yemen for training, and ‘it was 
the teachings of a firebrand Muslim preacher that put him on the path 
to jihad in his rough-and-tumble neighbourhood of north-eastern Paris’. 
F24 found evidence that Cherif had ‘appeared in a 2005 French TV 
documentary on Islamic extremism and was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison in 2008 for trying to join up with fighters battling in Iraq’ (France 
24, 2015h). According to his lawyer, however, Cherif was a ‘reluctant 
holy warrior, relieved to have been stopped by French 
counterespionage officials from taking a Syria-bound flight that was 
ultimately supposed to lead him to the battlefields of Iraq’. The 
evidence gathered by F24 thus did not clearly suggest that the 
purported military training directly transformed Cherif into a terrorist 
soldier. The cloud of doubt over Cherif’s prior involvement in terrorist 
combat was quickly dismissed by the reporters, who sealed his 
devotion to jihadi cause with official statements. The Minister of 
Interior was quoted saying that ‘Kouachi had been described by his 
fellow would-be jihadist at the time as “violently anti-Semitic”’ (France 
24, 2015h). Comment from another lawyer followed on Cherif’s 
subsequent time in prison was, ‘Kouachi became closed off and started 
growing a beard’. The lawyer also wondered ‘whether the stint behind 
bars transformed his client into a ticking time bomb’ (France 24, 
2015h). 
Exploration of the brothers’ private lives in the broadcaster’s efforts 
to build their terrorist profile also evolved around their Muslim 
connection. The younger brother, Cherif, was described as a person 
with ‘criminal record’, arrested for ‘conspiracy to prepare acts of 
terrorism’ back in 2005. French news reports ‘from that time’, wrote 
France 24 (2015j), ‘described Kouachi, a pizza deliveryman, as being a 
one-time pot smoker who “even had a girlfriend before marriage”’. 
According to France 24 (2015h), Cherif ‘was keener on spending time 
with pretty girls than on going to the mosque’. In the video obtained by 
the broadcaster, Cherif was seen ‘relaxed and smiling as he pals around 
with his friends’, and at one point, ‘with his baseball cap worn 
backward, Kouachi belts out some rap music and breaks into a joyful 
dance’ (France 24 (2015h). He was not portrayed as in possession of 
human characteristics such as joy, or having friends, in the period after 
receiving ideological instructions from the preachers. According to 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2009: 82), this ‘clustering’ of terms and 
‘retrospective pre-mediation’, the use of self-recorded footage can be 
imposed by media and public officials retrospectively, ‘rendering what 
the individual considered to be an innocent life one of criminal guilt’, 
illustrating one’s ‘propensity towards violence and/or its justifications’. 
Little was said about the older brother, Said Kouachi. The lack of 
criminal records, however, did not prevent Interior Minister from 
describing Said as ‘the jobless resident’, who was also ‘known to the 
authorities’, despite having never been prosecuted, because he was ‘on 
the periphery’ of illegal activities his younger brother was involved in 
(France 24, 2015h). Out of its own initiative, F24 conducted a check at a 
mosque in the brothers’ hometown to verify Said’s regular attendance. 
Local Imam confirmed that Said ‘frequented a prayer room’ and ‘wore 
traditional North Africa clothes to prayers’ (France 24, 2015h). This 
search for links with Islam was the only exploration of Said’s life which 
neatly connected Said’s suggested involvement in his brother’s criminal 
life to a Muslim environment. It further solidified the perception that 
crime and terrorism must indeed have a Muslim background. 
Hayat Boumeddiene is another example of a ‘terrorist’ produced by 
the mix of official and media discourses. Portrayed by F24 as Muslim 
who as an adult ‘converted to Islam, started wearing a niqab and 
consequently lost her job as a cashier’ (France 24, 2015k). Weaving 
Islam into her alleged participation in the attacks ultimately 
pronounced her guilty. This was evident when in a sudden twist of 
events, Boumeddiene’s status of a ‘suspected accomplice in the killing 
of a young female officer’ dramatically changed, with media reporting 
that she had in fact not been present in the country at the time of the 
attacks. F24 admitted that ‘she had left France for Turkey on January 2’ 
(6 days before the killing of the policewoman and a week before the 
supermarket hostage crisis). The broadcaster did not question, 
however, why she remained France’s ‘most wanted’ despite her clear 
absence from the scene of the crime. Instead, the broadcaster brought 
up a photograph of a fully veiled woman, allegedly Boumeddiene, 
posing with a cross-bow, in what was referred to as a ‘2010 training 
session in the mountainous Cantal region’ (France 24, 2015k). The 
insertion of the picture of an armed Muslim woman immediately after 
the comments on her absence from the attacks served as the 
broadcaster’s apparent verdict. It directed viewers’ attention towards 
her potential guilt and further cemented the connection between 
Muslims and terrorism. 
Construction of causes of the terrorist attacks 
According to F24, there were four causes behind the attacks: 
vengeance, pure cruelty, overseas training and influence of foreign 
terrorist groups. Revenge on the cartoonists was the prime motive 
driving the killings at Charlie Hebdo magazine. The Kouachis directly 
admitted it in their claim, ‘we avenged the Prophet Mohammed!’ 
captured in an amateur video. The broadcaster also acknowledged that 
‘the Kouachi brothers are thought to have carried out the attacks in 
revenge for the weekly’s repeated publication of cartoons mocking the 
Prophet Mohammed’ (France 24, 2015f). 
The attackers were also portrayed as having killed for the joy of 
killing. Their triumphant confession ‘we killed Charlie Hebdo!’ openly 
confirmed it. They were portrayed as carrying their plan with extreme 
cruelty when they ‘slaughtered 12 people’, and as leisurely confident 
and utterly fearless perpetrators who ‘strolled out ... calmly shooting a 
wounded police officer in the head as he writhed on the ground’ 
(France 24, 2015f). 
France 24 (2015j) also pointed to the ideological guidance from 
‘Islamic preachers’ that the attackers received and to links with foreign 
terrorist organisations as factors directly contributing to the attacks. 
The attackers ‘epitomized Western authorities’ greatest fear: Islamist 
radicals training abroad and returning to stage attacks on home soil’ 
(France 24, 2015f). 
Discussion 
The Foucauldian ‘regime of truth’ produced by F24 in its coverage of 
January 2015 attacks clearly linked terrorism to Muslim communities. 
The broadcaster also largely reflected the official message. Powell 
(2011) argues that news coverage of terrorism has become thematic 
and siding with governments. This is not surprising, because of the 
media reliance on the ‘framework of interpretation offered by public 
officials, security experts and military commentators, with news 
functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the 
security policies they implement’ (Norris et al., 2003: 1). The 
broadcaster also seemed to employ a relatively narrow definition of 
terrorism. From the outset, the attacks were linked to Islam and 
Muslims and were portrayed as an external to France threat coming 
mainly from foreign extremist organisations, such as Al Qaeda and the 
IS. No reasons for the attacks were sought inside France. No internal 
developments, such as discrimination, youth marginalisation, lack of 
employment opportunities, humiliation, relations between law 
enforcement and the Muslim community that could potentially 
contribute to the acts, were explored. 
Included in F24 discourse of terrorism: The Muslim and jihadi connection 
The broadcaster portrayed the attackers as de-personalised, with no 
references to personal relationships, or displaying human 
characteristics. Other than the obvious brotherly link between the 
Kouachis, as well as marriage relationship between two other suspects, 
Ahmed Coulibaly and Boumeddiene, there were no other relationships 
explored by the broadcaster. Parents were mentioned for the sole 
purpose of emphasising the suspects’ foreign, Algerian and Malian, 
background. This, combined with the consistent lack of references to 
the French citizenship of all involved, allowed the broadcaster to 
distance the suspects from France and silence the French traits present 
in their upbringing. They emerged from F24 stories as foreigners, 
strangers to the country. Their attacks were seen as an external 
undertaking, not directly produced by France and its people. 
All attackers were linked to Islam by word and image, and, in return, 
Islam was linked exclusively to terrorism. The only coverage of Muslims 
on F24 after the attacks portrayed them as violent, blood-thirsty 
perpetrators already involved in, or on the way to, jihad. Being Muslim 
inevitably leads to radicalisation and becoming a terrorist as a result of 
the process, ‘the radicalisation pattern apparent from his [Kouachi’s] 
criminal record is a familiar one in France, home to Europe’s largest 
Muslim population’ (France 24, 2015j). F24 probably saw no 
contradiction in putting ‘radicalisation’, ‘criminal record’ and ‘Muslim 
population’ into one sentence. Yet, by doing so, the broadcaster neatly 
and conveniently linked the three very different phenomena and 
introduced the causal relationships between them for the consumption 
of its global audience. In the eyes of the broadcaster, the meaning of 
‘Muslim’ coincided with criminal and military interpretation. Muslims 
and cross-bows, Muslims and black masks, Muslims and guns, Muslims 
and military training and Muslims and Al Qaeda were the only 
associations proposed by F24 through text and image. This is consistent 
with, explored by Nurullah (2010), dominant media logic in the West 
according to which terrorism = Islam = terrorism. The broadcaster did 
not make an effort to portray Muslims as in possession of, or 
association with, qualities conveying messages other than violence. 
The good ‘other’ 
The only stories that could potentially propose a different image of 
Muslims were the national burial of the police officer killed in the 
attacks and the citizenship granted to the immigrant from Mali who 
saved the lives of several hostages during the attack on the 
supermarket (France 24, 2015n, 2015o, 2015p). The policeman was also 
of Muslim background. Assigned to protect the magazine and the 
cartoonists who frequently offended his faith, he died while on duty, 
protecting French values. The Malian immigrant, whose Muslim faith 
was briefly mentioned, saved lives of Jewish shoppers in the same 
supermarket where another gunman, whose ‘Malian origin’ – not the 
fact that he was a Frenchman, born and bred in France – was frequently 
emphasised by the broadcaster, killed other Jews due to his ‘anti-
Semitic’ feelings. 
It was perhaps the first time in the history of terrorism in France that 
the two opposing forces of good and evil converged in the same 
incidences of the two attacks. In both cases, it was the attackers, only 
vaguely connected in the coverage to Islam as a religion and more to 
the Islamist indoctrination, who took lives on one side. It was pure and 
practising Muslims who protected and saved French lives on the other. 
In the F24’s event-driven coverage, however, the broadcaster’s 
narrative did not link Islam and Muslims to saving lives. There were no 
journalists’ visits to the local mosques of the killed policeman or the 
Malian immigrant, no conversations with Imams that would present 
Islam as a religion producing noble people or generating virtue. It is a 
shame that Islam’s contribution to peaceful society in France was not 
given the coverage it deserved. 
Excluded from F24 discourse of terrorism: The French connection 
The ‘common sense’ produced by F24 portrayed terrorism as external 
to France and largely unrelated to the domestic environment. Yet, 
pointing the finger at the brothers’ jihadi connection and loyalty to 
foreign terrorist groups mutes several French aspects of the story. The 
root causes, such as under-representative governance, or individuals’ 
resentment towards a government’s inability to affect change (Le Sage, 
2007; Piazza, 2006; Windsor, 2003) that might also have been at play, 
were absent from the reporting. Was there a chance that the attackers 
felt oppressed, under-represented, desperate, alienated or disillusioned 
about their life and opportunities in France? Could they have resented 
the government and society’s inability to offer equal opportunities? 
Likewise, the permissive factors existing in France were not explored by 
the broadcaster, either. Apart from a brief mention of a failure of the 
French intelligence, other physical, economic, institutional or political 
weaknesses that could have enabled the attacks were not investigated. 
Therefore, the political and socioeconomic conditions within France 
that make young French citizens take up arms and willingly undergo 
ideological and military training were swept under the carpet in F24’s 
discourse of terrorism. The broadcaster merely reported the Prime 
Minister’s concerns about the ‘social apartheid’ of migrant 
communities 2 weeks after the attacks, a type of reporting not 
empowered by the broadcaster’s own investigation. 
Another puzzle missing from the big picture sketched by France 24 is 
the gap between the timing of the attackers’ ideological indoctrination 
and the attacks they orchestrated in January 2015. In that unexplored 
gap of almost 10 years in one case and 6 years in another, the suspects 
did not travel overseas to join the holy war despite the numerous 
opportunities presented by ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya 
or Syria. All suspects remained in France, still inactive when in 2011, the 
same satirical magazine published cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. 
The incident did not provoke an extremist reaction from the already 
indoctrinated and trained in combat techniques Kouachis and Coulibaly. 
Why then did they not utilise their skills over the years? What was the 
direct trigger in 2015? 
Perhaps F24 could have investigated the experience of three young 
men in France and how it affected their lives. Exploration of this period 
could have proved crucial to the understanding of the wide range of 
terrorist causes. This could lead to directing eyes onto the political, 
economic and social setting within the French society that could have 
contributed to the trends in radicalisation across the country. 
Conclusion 
The narrow understanding of terrorism employed by French 
international broadcaster, which points to recruitment of ‘soldiers’ 
from Muslim communities, their Islamic indoctrination and overseas 
training, further alienates Muslim communities in France’s already 
divided society and does not fully explain the problem. It solidifies the 
image of Muslims as radicals and terrorists and promotes the discourse 
of Islam as posing threat to western societies. This view reinforces the 
explored by Fredette (2014: 81) dominant perception of Muslims in 
France and reduces Muslims to ‘religious beings’, who isolate 
themselves from the society. As a result, she believes, although French 
Muslims are no longer immigrants, they are not fully French either and 
become the ‘undeserving citizens’ of France. This discourse is almost a 
self-fulfilling prophecy which marginalises Muslims socially, politically 
and legally. The knowledge produced by F24, the broadcaster’s 
emphasis on the connection between Islam and terrorism perpetuate 
the image of Arabs and Muslims as a negative ‘Other’. It maintains 
observed by Said unequal relationship between the West and the East 
and propels the fear and discrimination of Muslims into the future. 
 
 
Note 
1. Five groups have been identified as main perpetrators of terrorist acts 
in the past: (1) Action Direct, a far leftist group; (2) The State-
sponsored FATAJ-RC (Abu Nidal Organisation); (3) The Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA); (4) ‘The Lebanese 
Connection’ (Fractions armées révolutionnaires libanaises/FARL, 
Comité de soutien avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du 
Moyen-Orient/CSPPA, Hezbollah); and (5) the Islamist Armed Group 
(Groupe Islamique Armé/GIA), considered the deadliest and 
responsible for assassination of 41 French citizens in Algeria between 
1992 and 1996, as well as for the bombing of Paris metro in 1996. 
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